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CASE COMMENTS
Cases, saw a distinction here. He wrote a number of the Supreme
Court's opinions in which the removal statute was interpreted.
Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162
U.S. 565 (1896); Kentucky v. Powers, 201 U.S. 1 (1905). Justice
Harlan said the denial referred to in the removal statute was, "pri-
marily if not exclusively a denial resulting from the constitution
or laws of the state and not one that arose at the trial of the case."
In Neal v. Delaware, supra, the petitioner claimed that he was de-
nied his rights by a provision of the state constitution; however,
the Supreme Court held that it must be presumed that the courts
of Delaware will now hold that provision void because of the new
amendments to the United States Constitution. "The presumption
should be indulged in the first instance that the state recognizes
an amendment to the federal constitution as binding on all citizens
and to be enforced without reference to any inconsistent provision
of its own constitution."
Thus, the reason for the strict construction of the removal statute
was the procedural requirement of having to swear to the denial
of rights before the trial. Rather than being criticized, this inter-
pretation has been considered very reasonable.
It is true that the concept of state action, as required by the
interpretation given the fourteenth amendment in the Civil Rights
Cases has become more inclusive. However, there has been no
corresponding tendency to extend the application of the removal
statute. Since the reasons for strictly construing each in the first
instance were independent and unrelated, the subsequent history
of one is not persuasive in arguing for a similar interpretation of
the other. As noted in the principal case, it is significant that
Congress did not make any changes in the removal statute in the
three recent civil rights acts.
Robert Willis Walker
Contracts-Agent's Right to Commission on Reorders After
Termination of His Employment
P, D's sales representative, after his employment had been
wrongfully terminated, brought an action to recover sales com-
missions for sales between D and third parties which P had
originally secured for D. D had agreed to pay commissions on all
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orders from customers solicited by P, "and on all reorders from the
same customers at any time in the future, even though you do not
write the order." Held, recovery denied. This clause gave P rights
during his tenure in that D would pay him commissions on orders
from these customers should they order directly from D or through
another representative. It did not give him any right to continued
commissions on reorders after his employment had ceased. Entis v.
Atlantic Wire & Cable Corp., 355 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1964).
The principal case is in accord with the weight of authority,
the courts being reluctant to allow an agent commissions on reorders
even though his employment was terminated without cause. This
comment is limited to discussing the agent's rights with respect to
these future commissions.
The reasoning behind the majority view in disallowing the
agent's claim is set out in the early case of Scott v. Engineering
News Pub. Co., 47 App.Div. 558, 62 N.Y.Supp. 609 (1900), upon
which the court in the principal case relied. In that case the agent
was to receive commissions on all orders and advertisements secured
by him for the principal's periodical, "and also upon all business that
followed the original contracts. . . ." The court held that this
agreement covered renewals during his employment and that after
his discharge the customers, upon making a reorder, entered into
a new contract with the principal. It would be unreasonable, the
court felt, to give the contract the interpretation the agent sought
since it would bind the customers to him perpetually.
Notwithstanding the line of cases following this view there have
been a number of instances both in the United States and England
allowing the agent to recover. In Edmund D. Hewins, Inc. v.
Marlboro Cotton Mills, 242 Mass. 282, 136 N.E. 159 (1922), in-
volving an oral agreement, it was held that the agent was to receive
commissions on all sales made thereafter to new customers intro-
duced by him to the principal, and thus the principal could not
terminate such a contract at will and deprive the agent of his
commissions. The Massachusetts court followed this same reason-
ing in Eastern Paper & Box Co. v. Herz Mfg. Corp., 323 Mass. 138,
80 N.E.2d 484 (1948), which also involved an oral contract.
In a more recent case, Reed v. Kurdziel, 352 Mich. 287, 89
N.W.2d 479 (1958), the contract was oral and for an indefinite
period and the court, in allowing a manufacturer's agent to recover
[Vol. 67
2
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 3 [1965], Art. 7
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol67/iss3/7
CASE COMMENTS
on sales to his former customers subsequent to discharge, said that
it appeared the principal was attempting to receive the benefit of
the agent's work without paying for it.
The agent's success has been more marked where the contract
has been oral. In those cases the courts have stressed the wrongful
termination, the benefits the principal would continue to receive,
as well as the alleged agreement between the parties. On the
other hand when the contract is in writing the results will be almost
entirely dependent on the language used and the construction to
be given it. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Murry, 198 Md.
526, 84 A.2d 870 (1951).
In the principal case the agent wanted to give a literal interpre-
tation to the term, "all reorders . . . at any time in the future."
In at least once instance this has been done. In Edward S. Mitchell,
Inc. v. Dannemann Hosiery Mills, 258 N.Y. 22, 179 N.E. 39 (1931),
the contract allowed termination on four months' notice by either
party and after the giving of the notice the agent was "to be
entitled to commissions . . . on shipments . . . to any of your
customers regardless of whether orders for such shipments are
obtained through you or not." The majority held the agent entitled
to continued commissions after the expiration of the notice period.
Justice Cardozo dissented on the grounds that the proper meaning
was that the agent should continue to receive the commissions only
for the four-month period. If the majority of this distinguished
court could give such a literal interpretation to a contract's terms,
when proper and fair notice of termination had been given the
agent, a substantial argument can surely be made for such an
interpretation where the discharge is without notice or justification
as it was in the principal case. However the courts, as a rule, do
not go this far.
The law in the United States on this subject can be said to be
in substantial accord with that of England as it is expressed in,
1 HASBURY'S LAws OF ENGLISH AGENcy Pt. 8, Para. 460 (3rd ed.
1952). An agent is not as a rule entitled to remuneration after termi-
nation of his employment for transactions between his principal and
third persons introduced by him to the principal, unless "there was
an express term in the contract to that effect, or a clear intention to
continue ... can be discovered from the construction of the contract
of agency; .... "
This necessary clear intention was absent in Crocker Horlock,
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Ltd. v. B. Long & Co., Ltd., [1949] 1 All E.R. 526 (K.B.), involving
commissions to be paid a clothing manufacturer's representative,
"on all orders, whether received direct or indirect and on all
repeats." The court found the remuneration was for the contract
period and that the parties had not agreed to continue payments
after termination. The issue, reasoning and holding of this case are
in complete accord with the principal case.
On the other hand, in British Bank for Foreign Trade, Ltd. v.
Novinex, Ltd., [1949] 1 All E.R. 155 (K.B.), the principal promised
the agent that in return for putting the principal in contact with
the agent's friend they would pay the agent a commission on "any
other business transacted with your friends"; the court overruled
the trial court and found for the agent. In referring to the trial
court's question, "Is the commission to be payable until the crack
of doom?" the court's answer was yes, since the principal had agreed
to do just that so long as it dealt with the party in question. The
court went on to point out that it was within the power of the
principal to bring the liability for commissions to a halt by ceasing
to do business with this particular customer. In a case of this nature,
where the agent induces a potentially large customer, over whom
he has some influence, to commence doing business with the princi-
pal in return for the principal's promise to pay commissions on all
future transactions between them, the likelihood of the agent's
success in an action to recover such commissions is much greater.
When, as in the principal case, the contract concerns a selling
agent whose duties were to solicit and service customers, such
agent usually has no right to commissions on reorders arising after
his employment has been terminated unless the terms of the con-
tract clearly provide for it or such an intention can be gathered from
the relationship between the parties. The courts have found this
intention more often in oral contracts than in written but the
instances in either case are rather limited.
David Gail Hanlon
Constitutional Law-Extension of State Credit-Industrial
Development Bond Act
In an original mandamus proceeding, relator, R, alleged that
the County Court of Marion County, in accordance with the pro-
visions of the state Industrial Development Bond Act, had adopted
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